OK, welcome back.
So now we're going to go through the three different theories that are talked about in the overview
section about concepts are about and for each theory, I'm going to show you the highlights, what the
theories about.
And I'm going to run through a couple of problems for that particular theory.
In the end, when we were wrapping up and also talk about the fourth theory, I will also look into
possible ways to overcome the problems for the different theories.
Right.
So classical theory.
So this is a theory that's been around for maybe 2500 years.
At least people like Plato or Aristotle, they hold similar views to this.
So according to the classical theory concept, C has definitional structure in that it is composed of
a simpler concepts that express necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the concept.
C. So this is a very common example.
So we have a bachelor and a bachelor is defined as a man that is unmarried.
So that's the two simpler concepts.
And bachelor is necessary both for man and unmarried.
And if it is a man and unmarried, if you're a man and you're unmarried, then you're also that's the
sufficient conditions for being a bachelor.
Right?
Simple, maybe.
So when you're then trying to categorize objects into concept C, according to the classical theory,
that's a psychological process where a concept is matched to an item.
If each and every one of the concepts definitional constituents, and that's the kind of the same concept
applies to the target.
So again, if we take the bachelor example, we have a set of people and some of them a man, some of
them a woman,
and some of them are unmarried.
And hence this subset who's both unmarried and men are bachelor.
Right.
So the different items that we looked at in this specific case, two people were both men and unmarried
and has the word bachelor.
Yeah, I think you see, this is a very simple way of looking at it.
However, there are very many problems with this very simplified view on what a concept is about.
So let's run through the most obvious ones.
The first one is actually called the Plato's Problem, and it goes like this.
So this is an example that Foder Lawrence and gargoyles have described as I'm using their example here.
So let's say that you would like to define what paint is about the verb to paint.
And I think you all have a gut feeling what you think painting is about and what the word paint is about.
But let's see if you have that after this as well.
So the idea of pleaders problem is that even the simplest concepts are very hard to define very clearly.
You will always find counterexamples that you can use that cannot break this binary idea that it's either
falling under the sea or not falling on the sea.
So let's take it in a couple of steps here to paint or not to paint.
So the verb to paint can be classically defined as Excalibur's why with paint.
Right.
So someone is covering something with paint.
Good.
But does this actually provide sufficient conditions for something falling under the concept?
That's the question, because if the concept, the the classical theory holds, then the definition
should be hold both sufficient and necessary conditions.
Right.
So let's take this first, try to see if we can do that.
So a paint factory X explodes and hence cover spectators Y would paint.
Will you then say that X have painted Y?
Hmmm, maybe so that's bull case, right?
I would probably not say that the factory have painted the spectators.
OK, so let's say that we then need to add something to the definition.
So we need to add that X needs to be an agent and Y needs to be a surface of some kind.
OK, so second try then
you and you are an agent, right?
Kicks over a bucket of paint over your new shoes.
Would you then say that you have painted your shoes?
Again, that is a tricky situation, right?
So would you say that you paint your shoes if you accidentally kick a bucket over them and bucket of
paint?
Probably not.
So we need to have something more to do to the definition here of a concept to paint.
So we need to add that the agent should cover the surface intentionally is just not happening something
that happens as an accident.
But it needs to be done intentionally.
Right.
So try.
Michelangelo wasn't painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.
He was painting a picture on the ceiling.
And it's a subtle difference here, isn't it?
So it was not there just to paint the ceiling.
He was actually there to paint a painting.
Right.
And that happened to be on the ceiling.
But was he then painting the ceiling?
So this is true, even though he was intentionally cover the ceiling with paint, so he was doing that,
but he wasn't painting the ceiling was painting this picture.
Right.
That's probably how are you going to use how he would use the term in language.
So we need to take into account that the primary intention of the agent and not just any intention,
must be to paint this particular surface.
So the primary intention should be to actually paint it and not just on a secondary intention, so forth,
try them.
So let's say again that Michelle Langley does have a primary intention to dip the tip of the paintbrush
in the paint when painting this picture.
Right.
Does that mean that Michelle Langley had Michelangelo have just painted the paint brush that is also
surface, right?
Probably not.
So again and again, I think you can go on for a fifth.
Try on the sixth.
Try in the seventh.
Right.
You can always find counterexamples.
Were you find all kind of holes in this definition and you tried to patch them in by just adding more
and more and more definition.
But it's very hard to see if you can ever find the rock bottom.
So that's the play those problems and have she has painted our fingers, right?
Or maybe, maybe not probably them.
So that's one problem with the classical theory concept.
And let's look at the slightly different one, which is a little bit related.
So we have this penguin.
So this is a famous quote.
What kind of a bird are you if you cannot fly?
Said the little bird to the duck.
What kind of a bird are you?
If you cannot swim, send it, said the duck, and died.
So what we're trying to point out here is what is called the topicality effect.
So it seems to be that we rank items with respect to how typical they are as members of a category.
But again, if you go back to the original classical definition, it doesn't say anything about something
that is more typical than another thing.
So he says if you fulfill all the conditions, then he will fall under sea.
Not you will not.
You will do it more or less.
It's a binary definition, right?
But it seems to be when we are thinking about birds, we tend to think that this dove is more like a
bird than a penguin or an ostrich.
I think that is how we generally think about the concept of being a bird.
And that makes us a little bit more problematic as well.
Because if you then say, according to classical theory of concept study birds, that one of the other
things that birds must be able to do is to fly than they are in bird.
But we know they are because they lay eggs and so on and so on and so on.
So this is what the typical artifact is about, is there the classical theory says nothing about more
or less necessarily sufficient conditions.
Good.
That was the classical theory concepts and the problems related to the classical theory concepts.
So now we're going to talk about the prototype theory concept, which has been kind of an answer to
the classical theory concept, but it's dated much, much later.
So that's actually 20th century stuff.
Good to see you there by.