OK, so was facts and truth, so now we're going to talk about social facts, so any type of object
and no only natural objects and properties on those objects are small, in fact, not only natural counts.
So if I'm saying that the money is on the mat, that is also a fact.
Right.
That could be related to the proposition that I have in my head.
But of course, if you look on that, if you think about that a little bit, you see that that is a
little bit different than the other one, because the that money is on the mat is actually collected
intentionality related phenomena.
So we already talked about that, that there is actually money that this paper that is lying on the
mat is money is something that only exists if we all think that it exists.
So the actual fact that that is the actual fact that there is actually money here is a collectively
relative phenomena, but could still be an objectively true statement.
Right.
So we can actually have objective knowledge about something, but where the phenomena is subjectively
relative and that is very interesting and extremely important here.
So this statement could be true.
The proposition can have the truth as a truth.
Value can come true as a true value, whereas the it still depends on this collectively intentionality,
relative phenomena.
So, for example, that a country is in a recession is subjectively true.
But it's about subjectively relative phenomena.
So this distinction I'm making here is the distinction between subjective and objective, and that goes
in two different dimensions.
So you have it in the ontological dimension.
That means what exists and you have it in the epistemic dimension.
That means what you can have knowledge about.
So you can actually have knowledge about something objectively where the phenomena is still subjective.
Lee, what if An almost still subjectively holds phenomena so that it's a little bit hard to start thinking
about that in the beginning, but it's very, very important and you're going to see why they wrong
and why what must this leads to, at least if you think if you ask the pragmatist, maybe Johnson,
who's talking a lot about this, actually won't agree with me here.
But but if you're using some of the of the pragmatists here, like Richard Rorty, who was very famous
for this, he would say something like this.
There is no basis for deciding what counts as knowledge and truth other than what one's peers will let
one get away with in the open exchange or claims, counterclaims and reason.
What it says here is actually there are no true knowledge at all because all knowledge will utterly
depend on subjective phenomena.
And those subjective phenomena is something that we can only agree on if we have an exchange of claims,
counterclaims and reason.
So this is called the pragmatic truth.
Right.
OK, very well, so now we cover both facts and social facts and we covered truth in the very common
sense and we talked about the more a little bit more problematic.
Pragmatic truth coalition.
Very good to see in the next lecture.