OK, just take one last lecture here about packaging, so I would just give you an example as well,
how you could package the domain model that we did from the very beginning.
So we did this domain model when we talked about the philosophical foundations for concept analysis
and conceptual modelling.
And we started off by talking about concepts as such.
And then we talked about the intentional states that you have and the network of intentional states.
We talked about that an intentional state is made up about psychological modes and the proposition.
And it's also related that you have a background abilities in the background that you are that are so
familiar for you and so common to you.
So you don't actually have intentional states about them that you just take for granted that you can
walk using your legs and so on.
So you aren't actually going around thinking about that.
And then we went into the philosophy of language and we talked about speech acts and speech act that
are related to intentional states because intentional states are usually leads to speech act if you're
talking or if you're using a language to express them.
And the speech act is made up of an electioneering force and a statement as which is the propositional
content for the speech.
And the proposition in our intentional state means the statements we said.
And then there were a couple of types of cautionary forces like submissives directive's assertions,
expressive, and the special kind, which was called the Declaration Inwell Special, because all the
other four had a direct connection up to psychological modes of the intentional state, whereas the
declaration then we didn't have a direct link back to any of the psychological modes.
The statement was then including predicates and references like the subject and a predicate in terms
of the signs that you use in that particular language.
And the predicate refers back to a concept which is the signified.
And then you have also reference girls refer back to an individual concept or the object here.
We also said that a proposition is what is called the truth bearer in relationship with facts.
So we have facts about objects out in the real world and how and and their relationship to other properties.
For example, saying that a car is pink is a fact.
And then we talked about brute facts, which are facts that are out there without our interventions
or we thinking about them.
And then we have institutional facts that are created very peculiarly using our declaration so that
where we tied up the the the relation between our language in terms of speech acts and declarations
and how they actually create facts out in the world that we don't objectively actually can think exists.
So we can objectively say that I have money, for example, but it's a relative fact that I have money
because it's relative to other people's intentional states and collective intentionality.
So we went through a law in that section and now we have also seen how we apply that very much more
practically using the moral language of UML, using our workshop techniques and using our documentation
techniques and packaging.
So if we just go back to this model and then we can say that this, of course, is the concept model
like any of all the other concept models we looked at.
I will probably come up with something like this, I'm not showing you the whole solution here and maybe
we would like to kind of reverse any of these associations and put some navigability on them.
But this is probably something I will come up with.
So we have a general notion about concepts, and they are one of the most basic key concepts in this
domain.
We also have another key concept called objects, which are out there, and another very fundamental
concept called facts, so they can form kind of three different subdomains within this larger domain.
Then we can have propositions, which is the propositional content in our minds and both both concepts
about and they can include references to concepts reference to objects of reference to facts and state
of affairs.
And then what we can have intentional states, which actually include these propositional contents that
are referring to all those three things.
And we can also make statements in our language which could be included in speech act or often are most
often are included in speech acts.
And the Speech Act ties back to the intentionality.
And here we get this meaning relation between the statements and the propositions and the intentionality
in the Speech Act.
So the Speech Act is the intended meaning.
And then we also had a reference back to this much more general abilities that we have in the background,
so something like this, and here you see that we could actually then layer on this.
And that's a little bit how I introduce the concepts for you.
So we started off talking about the most generic stuff like concepts in that area.
We talked about objects and we talked about facts.
And so they were very early on in those lectures.
And then we added on the more complexity of intentionality and so on.
OK, very good.
That was just kind of a quick example of how you can use packaging to abstract and make a large model
a little bit easier to dig into.
So you can talking about some areas within the larger model.
Good end of the section.
See you.